Jus ad Bellum - Should we have foreign boots on the ground in Haiti? To be or not to be, a case analysis

The dilemma surrounding this topic stems from Mr. Ariel Henry requesting military intervention to help him quell the gangs in Haiti. Mr. Henry was selected as prime minister by President Jovenel a few days before the latter's assassination. To avoid a power vacuum, Mr. Henry received the support of a foreign team of attachés known as the core group with the mission of stabilizing the country and organizing the next presidential election. The Core Group includes the UN Secretary-Special General's Representative, the ambassadors of Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, the E.U., the U.S., and the OAS.

This analysis originates from the ideas and views around the march scheduled for October 17, 2022, in New York City. These opinions differ between those who believe a foreign military force is a temporary solution to dismantle gangs and those who do not. Part of the population wants intervention to get rid of the gangs quickly so they can do their daily activities peacefully, while others see the intervention as an intrusion that will make things worse. It is a thorny subject on the mind of every concerned Haitian citizen.

To justify the goal of these peaceful marches, it begs the question, what is the best approach to solving Haiti's crises? If we reject the military intervention, what do we want from our neighboring OAS countries? are we looking for logistical and intelligence help? Are we looking to be left to our own devices? Can Haiti truly take care of the gangs and organize the next election?

Military cooperation vs. occupation vs. intervention

What Haiti needs is military cooperation, not intervention. There seems to be confusion among Haitian street debaters and thinkers between occupation and intervention. Semantics are important here. Occupation is usually longer term and involves antagonism with the incumbent regime and seeking complete control of the state affairs. In contrast, intervention is a broader term encompassing occupation, intercession, or military cooperation for a short-term goal. Some other forms of intervention activity include sanctions like blockades, economic boycotts and embargoes, international arrests, and assassinations of key officials. In this case, the request from Ariel's administration is a short-term intervention to reestablish order to get the election on the way. However, many fear what else that can also entail.

As of this writing, armored vehicles and other equipment are being delivered to Haiti from the U.S. and Canada. That is an excellent first step. Nevertheless, we must ensure that these vehicles are not used to protect only the oligarchs.

The constitutionality of Ariel Henry's request

The constitution is not clear about a prime minister calling for foreign involvement. After all, we are talking about a transitory head of state making radical decisions without a sitting president, as the constitution dictates. The jus ad Bellum of using foreign armed forces in Haiti should be decided only by an elected executive branch representative.

President Jovenel Moise died in July. His mandate would have ended arguably in February 2022. Legally, anyone chosen or hired by him should not have any legal functions past the said date unless ratified by a full senate and the higher court. Secondly, Mr. Henry was never sworn in. He is accused of delaying tactics to organize the election. He had a whole year to organize the elections. He never lifted one finger toward that goal. His de facto regime is insignificant and only serves the purpose of sowing more misery on the back of the Haitians. His actions so far only serve to give him time to select another corrupt individual from his secret cabal of friends to take control of the country's already depleted resources. He seems unfazed by going down in Haiti's history as an abject failure who missed the opportunity to do something great. Nobody wants him to continue at the helm. He has lost all political capital, and even his allies want him to go.

Ariel Henry is not being authentic with himself or with anyone else. The people of Haiti know too well that he is only going after crushing the demands asking for his departure. Fortunately, the United Nations pushed back against Henry's request and suggested a rapid-action response from a specialized team instead.

The interventionists his administration targets should ask themselves, if the population does not want Mr. Henry, then why send troops? Why not remove Ariel himself? Isn't it more economical? He has failed in his mission of transition. He has no political capital. Without real thought, one cannot help but think that the intervention is requested in bad faith.

Sociopolitical Consequences

The anguish caused by past military interventions in Haiti, or anywhere else, is well documented. It is perplexing to hear about it again in 2022. It is even more confusing when the request for intervention this time around comes from an unelected leader.

Having active-duty military personnel and heavy equipment on the grounds in Haiti sends the wrong message. War tanks circulating in the capital Port-au-Prince might do irreparable damage to the country's already-deficient roadways. How can we forget the famous incidence of cholera and the scandals over sexual abuse by the U.N. blue helmet members? How can we forget about children who are left fatherless? Every mission brings its own set of problems and crises.

A foreign military presence on Haiti's ground benefits the very few who have the privilege of having ample space enough to rent out. There is no denying a small economic value for the local vendors in servicing the troops while their mission is underway. However, most benefits go to the Haitian oligarchs and the interventionists themselves.

Proposed Solutions

Many have offered alternatives to rid Haiti of its gang activity: vigilantism, military-style gear and weaponry, intelligence, stopping the flow of guns and ammunitions, forming a special unit with the sole mission of disbanding and arresting gangs, finally.

Vigilantism -- usually occurs when the police force is insufficiently large or colludes with gang members. The issue with vigilantism is that many people can be killed without due process, resulting in the death of innocent people. The concept is appealing to many and has been implemented in several countries, including Haiti.

We all know, however, that violence breeds violence. Uprooting through vigilantism implies an ongoing battle that could lead to civil war. When emotions run high between neighbors, one may accuse the other of being a gang member. Thugs have an easy alibi in a society that condones vigilantism. The country's risk/reward balance is unfavorable.

Only when the legal system has completely failed can vigilantism be justified. For example, in rural Haiti, where sexual violence against women is rising, a lack of police officers invites lynching. These women can band together with the decent men in the area to become vigilantes not because they believe they are above the law but because the area is lawless. In this case, their vigilantism is justified.

Increasing the number of cops -- After all, this is a failed state with no resources to acquire supplies or pay its employees. As a result, adding more police officers is not a comfortable option. While it is evident that there is a paucity of money and qualified individuals that make it difficult to expand the police force, we cannot continue to use it as an excuse. The danger to this is that each passing minute brings new members for the gangs, making them harder to control or, better yet, completely wiped out.

Recommended Solutions

The recommended solutions are probably 20 years late. However, they are still viable.

Stopping the flow of guns must form part of an authentic and comprehensive solution. The Haitian government must make it clear to Washington that it needs help to clamp down on the flow of illicit weapons from the United States to Haiti. Mr. Henry needs to request intelligence data from the U.S. and the Dominican Republic on those orchestrating the flow. He must ask for help to sanction the Haitian officials linked to violence.

The table below from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives shows that 84.8 percent of forearms recovered from crimes in Haiti are traced back to the U.S. The remaining 15.2% are most likely from local law enforcement weaponry and the Dominican Republic.

Recruit and train a new non-politicized anti-gang police unit -- We sorely need at least an additional 30,000 trained individuals to protect the nation against the deterioration of gang activities. It will bring the total of police officers to 45,000. This solution fulfills three roles: 1) It keeps individuals from wandering in the street without a steady income stream. 2) It generates more economic activities. 3) It protects the population.

We must ensure that these individuals cannot be paid or corrupted by the oligarchs. Their salaries will come from recuperating the loss of revenue from tax evasion.

Possible Outcomes

An armed militia or a group of bandits has nowhere to run without supplies to support their operations. It needs a constant flow of goods to sustain itself. A hiatus will eventually harm their ability to function.

A new anti-gang unit can only create employment for young people in desperate need of a job, even if the compensation is subpar.

The local administration would show its resolve to restore law and order. It would demonstrate a genuine desire to curb gang activity. Foreign governments may improve the public's perception of their intentions by providing support and cooperation and demonstrating their commitment to helping Haiti.

HAMREC

Haitian American Resources Council.

2022 all rights reserved.